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I. INTRODUCTION 
As Martha Nussbaum has observed, “[h]uman infants arrive in the 
world in a condition of needy helplessness more or less unparalleled in 
any other animal species.”1 This neediness takes shape as three basic and 
fairly universal needs including “the basic bodily need for nourishment 
and care”,2 the “need for comfort and reassurance”,3 and the need for 
“cognitive stimulation”.4 Children are often unable to secure access to 
these fundamental and universal needs in Canada because of gross 
disparities of wealth resulting in many children living in poverty.
5
 This 
inability requires rectification because children who do not have secure 
access to these basic needs suffer adverse physical and mental impacts, 
are vulnerable to immediate harm, and their potential for growth and 
                                                                                                             
*  Associate at Farris, Vaughan, Wills & Murphy LLP. The author wishes to thank Joseph J. 
Arvay, Q.C., Benjamin L. Berger and Catherine Boies Parker for comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 
1  Martha C. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001) c. 4, at 181. 
2 Id., at 183. 
3 Id., at 185. 
4 Id., at 189. 
5 For example, the 2011 National Household Survey conducted by Statistics Canada 
showed that “10% of Canadians had total income of more than $80,400 in 2010 — almost triple the 
national median income of $27,800. To be in the top 5%, Canadians needed to have a total income 
of $102,300 and to be in the top 1% required $191,100, nearly seven times the national median 
income.” This survey was unable to show trends in income inequality because of the shift in 
methodology from the mandatory long-form census to the voluntary household survey (online: 
<http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/130911/dq130911a-eng.htm>). Statistics Canada’s separate 
release in June showed that three million Canadians, or 8.8 per cent of the population, had low 
incomes in 2011. And further that more than half a million, or 571,000 children aged 17 and under, 
lived in low income in 2011 and nearly a quarter of children who lived in single-mother families 
lived in poverty (online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/who-are-the-1-per-cent-a-
snapshot-of-what-canadians-earn/article14269972/?page=2>). 
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development is also compromised.
6
 Rather than focus on more rigorous 
proof of each of these factual propositions, this paper explores a possible 
route to an effective remedy. 
Political avenues of redress have so far been ineffective. People are 
now turning to courts to ensure these fundamental needs are not ignored. 
One of the challenges for advocates in the legal arena has been the 
courts’ reticence to recognize positive socio-economic rights under the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
7
 This reticence stems from at 
least two concerns. The first is a liberal concern about state interference 
with autonomy. The second is an institutional concern about the courts’ 
ability to address socio-economic wrongs. While these concerns appear 
to have undermined many claims from adults for positive socio-
economic rights protection under the Charter, there are principled 
reasons on both grounds to distinguish the case for children. In particular, 
because of both the special vulnerability of children, their capacity for 
development, and the state’s treatment of children in other contexts, 
recognition of positive rights for children, even where claims for such 
rights may have failed for adults in the past, is consistent with Canada’s 
legal/political traditions, current laws and jurisprudence. Therefore, we 
should look to children as the place to push positive section 7 rights 
forward under the Charter. 
                                                                                                             
6 See, e.g., Rhonda Kornberger, Janet E. Fast & Deanna L. Williamson, “Welfare or Work: 
Which is Better for Canadian Children?” (2001) 27 Can. Pub. Pol’y 407, noting at 407 that “studies 
have documented that children living in poor families are at greater risk of poor health and academic 
outcomes, accidental death and injury, dropping out of school, and developing emotional, 
psychosocial, and behavioural problems than other children” and at 409 that “these risks faced by 
poor children undermine their ability to grow and develop into healthy independent adults”. There is 
an obvious link between poverty and the basic need for nourishment and similar adverse outcomes 
have been noted in respect of children experiencing food insecurity: see, e.g., Community 
Nutritionists Council of BC “Making the Connection — Food Security and Public Health” (June 
2004), at 6-10. In British Columbia Public School Employers’ Assn. v. British Columbia Teachers’ 
Federation, [2013] B.C.J. No. 2056, 2013 BCCA 405 (B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal granted [2013] 
S.C.C.A. No. 458 (S.C.C.), the B.C. Court of Appeal appeared to take judicial notice of the fact that 
depriving a child of proper care was detrimental to a child’s development and participation in society 
as an adult when it held at para. 24: “Obviously anything that fosters the emotional and physical 
needs of infants and children of tender years tends to a healthier society. It is often observed that the 
roots of antisocial behaviour by adults can be traced to deficiencies of childhood care. Time afforded 
to parents for care for newborns and adopted children fosters a vital societal interest.” 
7 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
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II. THE CHALLENGING JURISPRUDENTIAL LANDSCAPE 
Section 7 of the Charter provides one of the most likely avenues of 
correction of socio-economic wrongs to children and it provides that 
“[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the 
right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles 
of fundamental justice.” To date, in approaching section 7, courts have 
typically drawn a distinction between negative rights (civil liberties 
requiring non-interference by the state) and positive rights (socio-
economic rights requiring state action for their realization).
8
 This 
distinction has been challenged by many as unconvincing given that it 
draws a false dichotomy between those interests that require state 
intervention (including possibly state expenditure) and those that do not.
9
 
Nevertheless, judicial interpretation of section 7 remains shackled to the 
requirement that the claimant demonstrate some deprivation arising from 
government action and has so far not been interpreted to protect positive 
socio-economic rights. The positive/negative rights distinction must 
therefore be attended to in any case that can be characterized as seeking a 
positive right under section 7. 
Justice Arbour was the first Supreme Court of Canada justice to endorse 
an interpretation of section 7 that encompassed positive socio-economic 
                                                                                                             
8 For discussion of the origins of s. 7 and its application to date, see Peter Hogg, “The Brilliant 
Career of Section 7 of the Charter” in J. Cameron & S. Lawrence, eds. (2012) 58 S.C.L.R. (2d) 195. 
9 Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] S.C.J. No. 29, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, at para. 53 (S.C.C.). See, 
e.g., Martha Jackman, “Charter Remedies for Socio-economic Rights Violations: Sleeping Under a 
Box?” in Kent Roach & Robert Sharpe, eds., Taking Remedies Seriously (Montreal: Canadian 
Institute for the Administration of Justice, 2009), at 281-85 [hereinafter “Jackman 2009”]. Indeed, 
Professor Jackman has observed that this distinction has long been abandoned under international 
human rights law and increasingly rejected in other constitutional democracies and that “the 
continued reliance by Canadian courts and tribunals on the distinction between positive and negative 
rights as a basis for dismissing socio-economic rights claims represents a fundamental failure of 
constitutionalism and the rule of law”. For Jackman, “all human rights are interdependent and 
indivisible, and that governments have a corresponding duty to respect, protect and fulfil socio-
economic rights on an equal footing with civil and political rights”. See also Martha Jackman, 
“What’s Wrong with Social and Economic Rights?” (2000) 11 N.J.C.L. 235, at 242-43 [hereinafter 
“Jackman 2000”]; Margot Young, “Section 7 and the Politics of Social Justice” (2005) 38 U.B.C. L. 
Rev. 539, at 549-50 [hereinafter “Young 2005”]; Louise Arbour, United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, “Freedom from Want — from Charity to Entitlement”, 
Lafontaine-Baldwin Lecture, Quebec City (2005) at 3, 15 [hereinafter “Freedom from Want”]. See 
also, in the s. 15 context, Hester Lessard, “‘Dollars Versus [Equality] Rights’: Money and the Limits 
on Distributive Justice” in J. Cameron & S. Lawrence, eds. (2012) 58 S.C.L.R. (2d) 299, at 301 
[hereinafter “Lessard 2012”]; and in the American context, Tamer Ezer, “A Positive Right to 
Protection for Children” (2004) 7 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L.J. 1, at 9-10, 47 [hereinafter “Ezer”]. 
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rights in Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General).
10
 At issue was a claim 
for equality, liberty and security of the person arising from a differential 
welfare scheme that left those recipients under the age of 30 significantly 
below the poverty level. Discussion here is limited to the judgments of 
the Court in respect of section 7. Justice Bastarache alone, and in dissent, 
held that section 7 protects only negative rights.
11
 In contrast, the 
majority held that “[o]ne day s. 7 may be interpreted to include positive 
obligations”,12 but that there was insufficient evidence in that case to 
support the proposed interpretation of section 7.
13
 Nevertheless, the 
majority left “open the possibility that a positive obligation to sustain 
life, liberty, or security of the person may be made out in special 
circumstances”.14 Justice Arbour’s spirited dissent concluded that section 
7 includes a positive dimension,
15
 noting that the existing jurisprudence 
left open the possibility that section 7 encompasses economic rights
16
 
and extends beyond legal rights.
17
 While she acknowledged that 
“virtually all past s. 7 cases” involved state interference with life, liberty 
or security of the person,
18
 Arbour J. noted that the structure of the 
Charter, which includes many other provisions commanding positive 
obligations from the state,
19
 the specific language of section 7,
20
 a 
purposive analysis of section 7, which gives the right to life some 
meaning,
21
 section 7’s position in the overall context of the Charter22 and 
the jurisprudence
23
 were all consistent with the view that section 7 
includes a positive dimension. 
                                                                                                             
10 [2002] S.C.J. No. 85, 2002 SCC 84 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Gosselin”]. This dissenting 
judgment was concurred in by L’Heureux-Dubé J., at paras. 99, 141-143. The possibility that s. 7 
was amenable to such interpretation was recognized in Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British 
Columbia) S. 94(2), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at para. 21 (S.C.C.) and Irwin Toy 
Ltd. v. Québec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, at para. 95 (S.C.C.). 
11 Gosselin, supra, note 10, at para. 209. 
12 Id., at para. 82, per McLachlin C.J.C. and Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major and Binnie JJ. 
13 Id., at para. 83. 
14 Id., at para. 83. 
15 Id., at para. 307. 
16 Id., at paras. 311-313. 
17 Id., at paras. 314-318. 
18 Id., at para. 319. 
19 Id., at para. 320. 
20 Id., at paras. 321-322, 336-343. 
21 Id., at paras. 344-348. 
22 Id., at paras. 323, 349-358. 
23 Id., at paras. 324-327. 
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The Supreme Court of Canada has not expressly addressed the issue 
of positive rights under section 7 of the Charter since Gosselin; however, 
a number of lower courts, most notably in Ontario and British Columbia, 
have recently considered the issue. 
In Ontario, subject to the possibility of a successful appeal of 
Tanudjaja v. Canada (Attorney General),
24
 it appears that such claims 
will be foreclosed from even proceeding to trial. In Tanudjaja the 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice dismissed an application for 
recognition of a positive right to affordable, adequate and accessible 
housing for all Canadians on the basis that it disclosed no reasonable 
cause of action and raised issues that were not justiciable. With reference 
to a number of earlier cases, the Court concluded that it was settled in 
Ontario that section 7 protects only negative rights and does not confer a 
free-standing right to life, liberty or security of the person.
25
 
The jurisprudence in British Columbia is less hostile. A claim for a 
positive section 7 right was dismissed in Pratten v. British Columbia 
(Attorney General), a case concerning the rights of gamete donor 
offspring.
26
 The right sought, while grounded in life, liberty and security 
of the person, was referred to as the right to know one’s biological 
origins. Without foreclosing that such a claim might ever be successful, 
the trial judge “concluded that this case will not be the ‘one day’ when 
s. 7 is interpreted to impose on the state a positive duty to act and 
legislate where it has not done so”.27 The Court of Appeal dismissed the 
appeal in respect of section 7 and did so without foreclosing that section 7 
                                                                                                             
24 [2013] O.J. No. 4078, 2013 ONSC 5410 (Ont. S.C.J.) [hereinafter “Tanudjaja”]; notice of 
appeal was filed on October 4, 2013. 
25 Id., at paras. 32-59, citing Doe v. Ontario, [2007] O.J. No. 3889 (Ont. S.C.J.), affd [2009] O.J. 
No. 570, 2009 ONCA 132 (Ont. C.A.) (no positive right to witness protection program); Good v. Toronto 
Police Services Board, [2013] O.J. No. 2290 (Ont. S.C.J.), revd but not on this point [2014] O.J. 
No. 3643, 2014 ONSC 4583 (Ont. Div. Ct.) (no positive obligation on government to prevent Charter 
breaches); Flora v. General Manager, Ontario Health Insurance Plan, [2008] O.J. No. 2627 (Ont. C.A.) 
(no positive right to funding for life-saving out-of-country medical treatments); Masse v. Ontario 
(Ministry of Community and Social Services), [1996] O.J. No. 363 (Ont. Div. Ct.), leave to appeal refused 
[1996] O.J. No 1526 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [1996] S.C.C.A. No. 373 (S.C.C.) (no positive 
right to minimal social assistance); Clark v. Peterborough Utilities Commission, [1995] O.J. No. 1743 
(Ont. Gen. Div.), appeal dismissed as moot [1998] O.J. No. 2915 (Ont. C.A.) (no positive right to be free 
from the requirement of a security deposit or no positive right to housing). 
26 Pratten v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2011] B.C.J. No. 931, 2011 BCSC 656 
(B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “Pratten SC”]. The author of this paper, along with Joseph J. Arvay, Q.C. 
and Sean Hern, acted as counsel for the plaintiff in Pratten. 
27 Id., at para. 291. 
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could include a positive dimension. In fact the Court of Appeal assumed 
that section 7 was susceptible to an interpretation guaranteeing positive 
rights, but found that the test endorsed by Arbour J. in Gosselin for 
grounding such a claim was not met.
28
 
More recently, in British Columbia in Inglis,
29
 the B.C. Supreme 
Court considered the government’s decision to cancel the Mother Baby 
Program — a program that allowed provincially incarcerated mothers 
and their babies to reside together at a correctional centre. The claimants 
argued that legislation that provided the authority to run the Mother Baby 
Program
30
 was inconsistent with the Charter in that it did not require the 
program’s continuation.31 The trial judge dismissed this argument, noting 
that under the legislation, the choice of which programs to establish (or 
cancel) is a matter of discretion.
32
 The legislation was therefore capable 
of being interpreted consistently with the Charter and the breach would 
only arise because of the exercise of discretion.
33
 For the trial judge, the 
issue was better framed as whether the government action in cancelling 
the Mother Baby Program unjustifiably infringed the mothers’ sections 7, 
12 and 15 rights under the Charter.
34
 Again, the focus here will be on the 
section 7 analysis. Rejecting that what the plaintiffs sought was, in effect, 
                                                                                                             
28 Pratten v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2012] B.C.J. No. 2460, 2012 BCCA 
480, at para. 62 (B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [2013] S.C.C.A. No. 36 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Pratten CA”]. The test for positive rights was first developed in Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney 
General), [2001] S.C.J. No. 87, 2001 SCC 94 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dunmore”], a case dealing with 
s. 2(d) of the Charter. A claimant must show the following: (a) The claim must be grounded in a 
fundamental Charter right or freedom rather than in access to a particular statutory regime (at para. 24); 
(b) The proper evidentiary foundation must be provided, before creating a positive obligation under 
the Charter, by demonstrating that exclusion from the regime constitutes a substantial interference 
with the exercise and fulfilment of a protected right (at para. 25); (c) It must be determined whether 
the state can truly be held accountable for the inability to exercise the right or freedom in question 
(at para. 26). 
29 Inglis v. British Columbia (Minister of Public Safety), [2013] B.C.J. No. 2708, 2013 
BCSC 2309 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “Inglis”]. 
30 The Correction Act Regulation, B.C. Reg. 58/2005 provided in relevant part: 
38(1) The person in charge must establish programs for inmates, including 
religious and recreation programs. 
(2) As far as practicable, the person in charge must establish programs designed 
to assist inmates to 
(a) improve their education or training, and 
(b) reduce the risk they present to the community. 
31 Inglis, supra, note 29, at para. 350. 
32 Id., at para. 351. 
33 Id., at para. 354. 
34 Id., at para. 358. 
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a positive right to access the Mother Baby Program under section 7, the 
trial judge reasoned that the cancellation of the Mother Baby Program 
resulted in the involuntary separation of mothers and newborns and was 
therefore a deprivation, in other words a negative right.
35
 The trial judge 
found this cancellation to be made pursuant to an illegitimate objective 
and to be arbitrary, overbroad and grossly disproportionate and not saved 
by section 1.
36
 Turning to the issue of remedy, the trial judge declared, 
among other things, that the decision to cancel the program was contrary 
to section 7 of the Charter and directed the government to administer the 
legislation in a manner consistent with her reasons.
37
 
The reasoning and outcomes in Inglis and Tanudjaja are hard to 
reconcile and demonstrate the way in which the distinction between 
positive and negative rights eludes definition. In both cases, rights-
enhancing programs were implemented and then restricted or cancelled.
38
 
In both cases, diminution of these programs had significant negative 
impacts on the life, liberty and security of the person of the individuals 
reliant on them, including loss of custody of children.
39
 The Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice viewed the claim as a positive rights issue and 
held that section 7 did not protect positive rights and as such the 
governments of Canada and Ontario were free to amend, lessen or cut 
programs or benefits without breaching Charter rights. The B.C. 
Supreme Court applied a negative rights analysis and reached the 
opposite conclusion.
40
 
The Ontario Superior Court of Justice’s analysis of the issue as a 
claim for positive rights is consistent with the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s approach in Gosselin. Yet the judgment in Inglis has not been 
appealed and remains the law in British Columbia. Thus there is 
conflicting jurisprudence within Canada on the issue of whether a claim 
for continuation of a program is a positive right and whether such a claim 
                                                                                                             
35 Id., at para. 394. 
36 Id., at paras. 501, 655. 
37 Id., at paras. 656, 658. While children featured in the factual matrixes of both Pratten and 
Inglis, in neither case was the B.C. Supreme Court faced with any arguments such as those developed 
below in respect of the unique position of children in relation to the state and why this position makes 
children’s claims for positive rights more amenable to recognition. 
38 For a description of the erosion of programs see Tanudjaja, supra, note 24, at paras. 16-23. 
39 Id., at paras. 24-26. 
40 See, e.g., id., at paras. 33, 35, 37-40, 49. 
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is protected by section 7.
41
 This conflicting jurisprudence leaves open the 
argument (at least outside of Ontario) that section 7 protects positive 
rights, contrary to the decision in Tanudjaja that such a claim was bound 
to fail. From an advocacy point of view, one might question whether the 
same result might have been reached in Inglis by grounding the claim in 
the positive rights of the children in question, rather than their mothers. 
Regardless, what decisions like Inglis demonstrate is a judicial appetite 
and ability to respond to socio-economic wrongs but a hesitance to 
explicitly recognize a positive right in fashioning this response. The 
source of this reluctance may be a liberal anxiety about interfering with 
autonomy, and also a worry about institutional competency. There are 
reasons to distinguish both concerns in respect of recognition of positive 
rights for children. Such recognition is responsive to children’s 
vulnerable nature, capacity for development and special position in 
relation to the state, and is consistent with Canadian laws and 
jurisprudence. It is also consistent with the trend in foreign and 
international law, which has increasingly leaned toward recognition of 
positive rights.
42
 
III. THE SPECIAL STATUS OF CHILDREN IN LIBERAL RIGHTS 
DISCOURSE 
In the U.S. context, Tamer Ezer, senior program officer in the Law 
and Health Initiative of the Open Society Public Health Program, has 
                                                                                                             
41 Not all cases that result in the continuation of a government program properly form part 
of this conflicting jurisprudence. For example, although the outcome in Canada (Attorney General) 
v. PHS Community Services Society, [2011] S.C.J. No. 44, 2011 SCC 44 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“PHS”] was the continued operation of a safe injection site, PHS does not properly fit within this 
conflicting jurisprudence. At issue in PHS was the state’s blanket prohibition against the possession 
and trafficking of illegal drugs. While the remedy included an order that the federal Minister of 
Health grant Insite an exemption from the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19 
(which enabled Insite to operate without contravening the Act), the federal government was not 
required to provide the services in question. These services were provided by a provincial health 
authority. Thus PHS is properly viewed as a negative rather than a positive rights case despite the 
continuation of the safe injection site as a result of the judgment. 
42 See, e.g., in Malcolm Langford, “The Justiciability of Social Rights: From Practice to 
Theory” [hereinafter “Langford 2008”] in Malcolm Langford, ed., Social Rights Jurisprudence: 
Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008) [hereinafter “Social Rights Jurisprudence”], at 4. See also Ezer, supra, note 9, at 9; Young 
2005, supra, note 9, at 546; Jackman 2009, supra, note 9, at 281; “Freedom from Want”, supra, 
note 9, at 13-14. 
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conceptualized children’s rights as arising from their “very dependence 
and capacity for growth”.43 Recognition of children’s dependence and 
capacity for growth has important ramifications for how public policy 
and the law within such a political system should approach the issue of 
children’s rights. However, as Ezer has observed in the American 
context: 
Children are an anomaly in the liberal legal order. Conceptualizations 
that work in other areas of human rights break down in the context of 
children. Children defy the conventional view of rights as implying 
fully rational, autonomous individuals who can exercise free choice and 
require freedom from governmental interference. Lacking fully 
developed rational capabilities, children are dependent “incompetents” 
by definition. Furthermore, unlike the term “individual”, the term 
“child” does not stand alone from all others, but necessarily implies a 
relationship.
44
 
These observations are equally applicable in Canada, where the 
“Charter has come of age in a neo-liberal era, one in which whatever 
political consensus there once was regarding distributive justice has 
splintered and dissolved”.45 The liberal rhetoric, placing responsibility on 
the private individual rather than the public state, has been instrumental 
in framing the negative rights analysis of section 7.
46
 The prevailing 
approach to section 7, then, is particularly ill-adapted to children. 
Instead, children’s rights are better conceived as positive rights and 
the more closely the right claimed is connected to one of the three basic 
needs outlined above, the stronger the demand for positive constitutional 
protection of such needs in the interests of “justice”. The theory of 
                                                                                                             
43 Ezer, supra, note 9, at 3. 
44 Id., at 1. Ezer notes at 2 that the “founders of liberal rights theory perceived children to be 
outside the scope of their philosophies”. Ezer has therefore theorized that the U.S. Constitution 
should be interpreted to impose a positive right to state protection from corporal punishment for 
children. In Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada, [2004] S.C.J. No. 6, 
2004 SCC 4 (S.C.C.) the Supreme Court of Canada rejected an argument that a negative 
interpretation of s. 7 applied to protect children from corporal punishment. No positive right to such 
protection has been tested. 
45 Lessard 2012, supra, note 9, at 300. While Canadian rights culture has been significantly 
influenced by the United States, Canadian rights culture has “a distinctive commitment to social 
rights and to an emerging system of international human rights protections”: Martha Jackman & 
Bruce Porter, “Socio-Economic Rights Under the Canadian Charter” [hereinafter “Jackman & Porter 
2008”] in Social Rights Jurisprudence, supra, note 42, at 210-11. 
46 Lessard 2012, id., at 300-301. 
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“justice” relied on here is not merely about remedying the “discrete 
symptoms”47 of social inequality, but rather about ensuring that everyone 
is enabled to meet his or her full potential for development and thereby 
given an equal opportunity to be involved in society’s most important 
institutions, which ultimately control distribution of wealth, goods and 
opportunity.
48
 For children, to fail to treat the symptom of injustice will 
perpetuate systems and structures of injustice because compromised 
child development will lead to greater chance of adult exclusion from 
participation in the economic, political and legal community.
49
  
Children’s special character as uniquely dependent and capable of 
development and growth undermines the first objection raised to positive 
rights which is the objection grounded in the liberal anxiety about 
interference with autonomy. First, children do not fit easily within 
liberal rights discourse and this is a principled reason or a “special 
                                                                                                             
47 Joel Bakan, Just Words: Constitutional Rights and Social Wrongs (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1997) [hereinafter “Just Words”], at 51 raises the concern that recognition of socio-
economic rights has the potential to deal “only with discrete symptoms, leaving underlying social 
structures untouched”. 
48 This theory of justice is drawn from Rainer Forst, Justification and Critique, translated 
by Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014). Forst offers two ways of thinking about justice. 
The first is focused on goods and their recipients and in particular who should get what goods for 
what reasons “in order to compensate for arbitrary natural and social differences” (at 11). The 
second, and the one endorsed by the author, is focused on the structures within which the question of 
who should receive what for what reasons is decided. Forst posits (at 36) that “[f]undamental justice 
assures all citizens an effective status ‘as equals’, as citizens with opportunities to participate and 
wield influence. Fundamental justice is violated when primary justification power is not secured for 
all equally in the most important institutions.” This concept of justice is also consistent with the 
values underlying the Charter, which include social justice and enhanced participation in society: 
Jackman & Porter 2008, supra, note 45, at 220. 
49 The idea that positive rights will enhance citizenship by enhancing social participation has 
been developed elsewhere: see, e.g., Margot Young, “The Other Section 7” in E. Mendes & S. Beaulac, 
eds. (2013) 62 S.C.L.R. (2d) 3, at 46-47, citing Thomas Humphrey Marshall, Citizenship and Social 
Class (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950). Jackman & Porter 2008, id., at 229; Just Words, 
supra, note 47, at 135, citing Bruce Porter “Social and Economic Rights and Citizenship: Draft Paper 
Prepared for the Institute for Research and Public Policy, Victoria, BC” (1991); Young 2005, supra, 
note 9, at 541, 548. Ezer has observed that a society “which bases its rewards so heavily on achievement 
… should give all young people a decent chance to compete and succeed”: Ezer, supra, note 9, at 40. 
The same observation is applicable in Canada. The lasting effects of failing to meet children’s basic 
needs also makes clear that we can add “consistency with unwritten constitutional principles” to Arbour 
J.’s rationales for interpreting s. 7 as including a positive dimension, at least with respect to children. In 
particular, if protection of children’s fundamental rights will safeguard their ability to participate in 
society’s most important institutions, this promotes the principle of democracy and specifically 
“evolutionary democracy moving in uneven steps toward the goal of universal suffrage and more 
effective representation” of all, including those families suffering from social inequality: Reference re 
Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at para. 63 (S.C.C.). 
(2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) CHILDREN AND CHARTER CHANGE 547 
 
circumstance”50 auguring in favour of recognizing positive rights for 
children under section 7 of the Charter even when such claims for adults 
may have failed in the past. Second, recognition of such rights gives rise 
to a much greater possibility that the values underlying liberal rights — 
namely autonomy and self-reliance — may eventually be achieved.51 
Finally, such a development is in the interest of justice because it ensures 
that children living in poverty today will have an equal opportunity in the 
future to participate in important institutions with the potential to 
ameliorate present systems of disadvantage. 
Altering the traditional negative rights approach to section 7 in light 
of the recognition of children’s basic dependence and capacity for growth 
is also consistent with the Canadian legal landscape, which treats 
children as requiring different considerations in light of these very 
considerations. This proposition, which is developed below, goes some 
distance to answering the second objection to positive rights and this is 
the objection grounded in institutional concerns about courts’ capacity to 
remedy socio-economic wrongs. 
IV. THE TREATMENT OF CHILDREN IN CANADIAN LAW 
1. Legislative 
Canadian legislation conceptualizes children as dependent and 
vulnerable and deserving of protection of both their physical and mental 
well-being and also their potential for development. This conceptualization 
gives expression to the state’s tacit recognition that children’s special 
vulnerability demands a departure from the classic liberal approach to 
individual autonomy. Illustrative examples of this phenomenon are 
                                                                                                             
50 Gosselin, supra, note 10, at para. 83. 
51 I do not suggest that individual choice can be understood as other than societally 
constructed and I make no normative claim about the role that individual choice plays in current 
adult rights jurisprudence. In such cases government lawyers typically argue that causation is 
negated by individual choice. Recently the Supreme Court of Canada has rejected this argument 
noting the lack of “choice” entailed in prostitution and injection drug use: see, e.g., Canada 
(Attorney General) v. Bedford, [2013] S.C.J. No. 72, 2013 SCC 72, at paras. 79-92 (S.C.C.); PHS, 
supra, note 41, at paras. 97-106. For discussion of the role that the notion of choice ought (and ought 
not) to play in the consideration of (adult) rights claims, see Margot Young, “Social Justice and the 
Charter: Comparison and Choice” (2012-2013) 50 Osgoode Hall L.J. 669, at 687-97; Margot Young, 
“Context, Choice, and Rights: PHS Community Services Society v. Canada (Attorney General)” 
(2011) 44 U.B.C. L. Rev. 221, at 248-52. 
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myriad. An exhaustive account is beyond the scope of this paper; however, 
the following examples establish the point.  
In the civil context, family law prioritizes the “best interests of the 
child”.52 While parents have a “protected sphere of parental decision 
making”, it is rooted “in the presumption that parents should make 
important decisions affecting their children both because parents are 
more likely to appreciate the best interests of their children and because 
the state is ill-equipped to make such decisions itself”.53 Protecting the 
best interests of the child ensures the child’s present mental and physical 
safety and, concomitantly, his or her potential for growth. 
Despite the presumption in favour of parental decision-making, 
where parents or other authorized caregivers do not meet the requisite 
standards of care for a child, the state can intervene, including  
by instituting child protection proceedings for removal of children 
from their parents’ care.54 Such intervention gives expression to  
the public’s responsibility towards children. As Professor Wilson 
explains: 
Child protection laws represent the public’s responsibility towards 
children. This responsibility is discharged through an ongoing 
balancing of the community’s interest in the proper parenting and 
development of children, with that of the individual parent’s right to 
privacy and right to raise children as he or she sees fit.
55
 
                                                                                                             
52 Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. 3 (2nd Supp.), ss. 16-17; Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, 
c. 25, s. 37; Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12, s. 24; see also Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, May 28, 1990, Can. T.S. 1992 No. 3, (ratified December 13, 1991) 
[hereinafter “Convention on the Rights of the Child”], which describes “the best interests of the 
child” as a primary consideration in all actions concerning children (art. 3) and then sets out a 
framework under which the child’s own input will inform the content of the “best interests” 
standard, with the weight accorded to these views increasing in relation to the child’s developing 
maturity. This framework thus gives expression to a child’s potential for growth and development 
(see, e.g., arts. 5, 12, 14 and C. (A.) v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), [2009] 
S.C.J. No. 30, 2009 SCC 30, at para. 93 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “C. (A.)”]); see also Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, December 18, 1979, 1249 
U.N.T.S. 13, (1980) 19 I.L.M. 33, ss. 5, 10, 16. 
53 B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1994] S.C.J. No. 24, [1995] 1 
S.C.R. 315, at para. 85 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “B. (R.)”]. 
54 Child, Family and Community Service Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 46; Child and Family 
Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.11. 
55 Jeffery Wilson, Wilson on Children and the Law, loose-leaf (Markham, ON: LexisNexis 
Canada, 1994) [hereinafter “Wilson on Children”], at 3-1. Notions like “proper parenting and 
development of children” are culturally informed. It is for this reason that looking back at the history 
of child welfare law in Canada has led others to observe that it has been motivated by damaging 
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Thus it is a concern not only for the physical protection of children but 
also for their development that informs child welfare laws. 
Children’s vulnerability and development is protected in other 
areas of civil law as well. Below a certain age, subject to limited 
exceptions, children are required to attend school;
56
 there are 
restrictions on their freedom to be employed;
57
 they are not permitted 
to drive;
58
 there are restrictions on what films they can attend;
59
 restrictions 
on their right to marry;
60
 limitations periods do not begin to run against 
them until they reach the age of majority;
61
 and the list goes on. 
The Criminal Code imposes duties and creates offences that 
specifically protect children as potential victims of crime in recognition 
of their particular vulnerability.
62
 When children are accused of criminal 
                                                                                                             
classist and colonial impulses: see, e.g., John J. Borrows & Leonard I. Rotman, Aboriginal Legal 
Issues: Cases Materials & Commentary, 3d ed. (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2007), c. 10, at 
830 [hereinafter “Borrows & Rotman”]; Hester Lessard, “The Empire of the Lone Mother: Parental 
Rights, Child Welfare Law, and State Restructuring” (2002) 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 717, at 727 
[hereinafter “Lessard 2002”]. 
56 Wilson on Children, id., Appendix 13; School Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 412, s. 3; Education 
Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.2, s. 21. 
57 Wilson on Children, id., Appendix 18; Employment Standards Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 113, 
s. 9; Employment Standards Regulation, B.C. Reg. 396/95, ss. 45.1, 45.5, 45.7, 45.15; Occupational 
Health and Safety Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. O.1, s. 25; Constructions Projects Regulation, O. Reg. 
213/91, ss. 16, 295; Industrial Establishments Regulation, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 851, s. 4; Mines and 
Mining Plant Regulation, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 854, s. 8; Oil and Gas Offshore Regulation, R.R.O. 
1990, Reg. 855, s. 4; Window Cleaning Regulation, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 859, s. 8; Licences to Sell 
Liquor Regulation, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 719, s. 23; see also the International Labour Organization 
(ILO No. 182) Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of 
the Worst Forms of Child Labour, 2133 U.N.T.S. 161; Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child on Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, June 5, 2000, Can. T.S. 2002, No. 
5 (ratified July 7, 2000), ss. 1-5. 
58 Motor Vehicle Act Regulations, B.C. Reg. 26/58, s. 30.04; Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O, 
1990, c. H.8, ss. 37-38. 
59 Motion Picture Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 314; Motion Picture Act Regulations, B.C. Reg 
260/86, ss. 3, 5; O. Reg. 452/05, s. 3. 
60 Marriage Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 282, ss. 28-29; Marriage Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.3, ss. 5-6; 
see also Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and 
Practices Similar to Slavery, 226 U.N.T.S. 3, s. 2. 
61 Limitation Act, S.B.C. 2012, c. 13, s. 18; Limitation Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 198, s. 47. 
62 Illustrative examples in the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 include the duty to 
provide necessaries of life (s. 215) and the offences prohibiting: abandoning a child (s. 218); 
abducting a child (ss. 281-286); corrupting a child (s. 172); killing a child (ss. 223(2), 233, 237, 
238); having sex with a child (ss. 151-153, 810.1, 811). The fact that a victim of a crime is a child is 
an aggravating factor in sentencing (s. 718.2(a)(ii.1)) as is profiting from child pornography 
(s. 163.1(4.3)). Protective measures are taken in respect of children who must testify at criminal 
trials (ss. 486.1-486.4). See also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights New York, 
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wrongdoing, “special rules based on reduced maturity and moral capacity 
have governed young persons in conflict with the law from the beginning 
of legal history”.63 These rules also protect young persons from 
publication of their identities and emphasize rehabilitation rather than 
punishment if they are convicted.
64
 These special rules support the thesis 
that it is not only children’s dependence but also their capacity for 
growth that motivates the law.  
Canada has also signed and ratified a number of international 
instruments that recognize the need to positively protect children rather 
than endorsing a laissez-faire attitude to their well-being and 
development.
65
 While not binding unless and until incorporated into 
Canadian law,
66
 these international instruments are important interpretative 
                                                                                                             
December 16, 1966, Can. T.S. 1976, No.47, ss. 6(5), 10; Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, May 25, 
2000, 2171 U.N.T.S. 227, ss. 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10; Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking 
in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime, November 15, 2000, Can. T.S. 2002, No. 25; Supplementary 
Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to 
Slavery, June 17, 1999, Can. T.S. 1963, No. 7, ss. 1, 2, 3, 8; International Convention for the 
Suppression of Traffic in Women and Children, September 30, 1921, as amended by the November 12, 
1947 Protocol, 93 U.N.T.S. 43, ss. 1, 3, 4, 6, 7; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Code, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90, ss. 6, 7; and one of the only international commitments with respect to children to 
have actually been incorporated into Canadian law: Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction, October 25, 1980, Can. T.S. 1983, No. 35 — see Children’s Law 
Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12, Schedule. 
63 R. v. B. (D.), [2008] S.C.J. No. 25, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.); R. v. C. (R.), [2005] S.C.J. 
No. 62, 2005 SCC 61, at para. 41 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “C. (R.)”]; Youth Criminal Justice Act, S.C. 
2002, c. 1; Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra, note 52. 
64 C. (R.), id., at para. 40. 
65 Most significantly here, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra, note 52, 
discussed in more detail below; Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, December 13, 
2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3, Can. T.S. 2010 No. 8, ss. 3(h), 4(3), 7, 8, 16, 18, 23, 24, 25, 30; 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, December 16, 1966 (entered into 
force January 3, 1976), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, Can. T.S. 1976 No. 46, ss. 10, 12-14 [hereinafter 
“International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”]; International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, December 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, Can. T.S. 1976 No. 47, ss. 6(5), 
10, 14, 17, 23, 24; Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of 
Intercountry Adoption, May 29, 1993, Can. T.S. 1997, No. 12; Geneva Protocol No. 1 Additional to 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts 8 June 1977, Can. T.S. 1991, No. 2, ss. 77-78; Geneva Convention 
No. 4 Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1949, Can. T.S. 
1965, No. 20, ss. 17, 24, 38, 50, 82, 89, 94, 132; Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 
August 30, 1961, Can. T.S. 1978, No. 32, ss. 1-9. 
66 [1999] S.C.J. No. 39, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, at paras. 69-71 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Baker”]. 
Only a small number of international instruments affecting children have been so incorporated, none 
of which are my focus here. 
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aids in respect of Canadian legislation including the Charter.
67
 Perhaps 
most notably, the Convention on the Rights of the Child — which has been 
signed and ratified but not incorporated into Canadian law by Parliament 
or the legislatures — provides that “the child, by reason of his physical and 
mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including 
appropriate legal protection”.68 As the Supreme Court of Canada noted in 
Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration):  
The values and principles of the Convention recognize the 
importance of being attentive to the rights and best interests of children 
when decisions are made that relate to and affect their future. In 
addition, the preamble, recalling the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, recognizes that “childhood is entitled to special care and 
assistance”. … The principles of the Convention and other international 
instruments place special importance on protections for children and 
childhood, and on particular consideration of their interests, needs, and 
rights. They help show the values that are central in determining 
whether this decision was a reasonable exercise of the [Humanitarian 
and Compassionate Review] power.
69
 
The Convention places a positive obligation on states parties to 
“undertake all appropriate legislative, administrative, and other measures 
for the implementation of the rights recognized in the present 
Convention”. With regard to “economic, social and cultural rights” states 
parties are required to “undertake such measures to the maximum extent 
                                                                                                             
67 Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] S.C.J. No. 45, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038, at 
1056 (S.C.C.); Baker, id., at para. 70; United States v. Burns, [2001] S.C.J. No. 8, 2001 SCC 7, at 
para. 80 (S.C.C.); Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] S.C.J. No. 3, 
2002 SCC 1, at para. 46 (S.C.C.); Health Services and Support — Facilities Subsector Bargaining 
Assn. v. British Columbia, [2007] S.C.J. No. 27, 2007 SCC 27, at para. 69 (S.C.C.). 
68 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra, note 52, Preamble. This recognition of the 
need to protect children in the preamble is then elaborated upon in the articles of the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child and includes a recognition of the need to positively protect a child’s 
development: see, e.g., arts. 3 (best interests), 2, 4 (duties of states implementing children’s rights), 6 
(life, survival and development), 7-8 (identity, nationality, name, family), 9 (separation from 
parents), 10 (international family reunification), 11 (illicit transfer and non-return of children 
abroad), 12 (expression), 17 (ensuring access to information and media), 18-20 (parental and state 
duties in upbringing, development, and protection from abuse), 21 (adoption), 22 (immigration and 
refugee), 23 (disability), 24-25 (standard of health), 26 (social security and social insurance), 27 
(standard of living and development), 28-29 (education), 30 (Indigenous rights), 31 (recreation and 
leisure), 32 (economic exploitation), 33 (drugs), 34 (sexual exploitation), 35-36 (abduction and 
trafficking), 37, 40 (penal systems and liberty), 38 (armed conflict), 39 (recovery and reintegration 
of victims). 
69 Baker, supra, note 66, at para. 71. 
552 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
of their available resources and, where needed, within the framework of 
international co-operation”.70 The Convention requires that states parties 
“ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival and development of 
the child”.71 The Supreme Court of Canada has described the Convention 
as “the most universally accepted human rights instrument in history”.72 
Many of the Convention’s terms relate to the three basic needs identified 
above and include positive obligations on states parties to ensure their 
attainment. In reliance on the Convention, courts have interpreted 
domestic laws affecting children as requiring recognition of their unique 
nature and requiring special protection of children.
73
  
2. Jurisprudential 
The fact that legislation affords such scope for courts to take account 
of and impose remedies in light of children’s needs and capacity for 
growth supports that even the state acknowledges that courts are 
institutionally capable of doing so. While the remedies discussed so far 
are imposed by courts in the context of a specific statutory scheme 
enacted by the legislature, in other contexts courts act without any such 
framework. The state’s recognition of courts’ institutional capacity to 
impose such remedies is not surprising, then, given the long history of 
courts’ protection of children without statutory authority. This history 
dates back centuries and likely originates with the English King’s “royal 
prerogative to act as guardian of persons under legal disability such as 
infants or mental incompetents”.74 Later the Crown exercised its 
jurisdiction through the Lord Chancellor, the Court of Chancery and 
eventually the superior courts of inherent jurisdiction of the provinces.
75
 
The courts’ jurisdiction to act as guardian for persons under a legal 
disability (including minors) is known as its parens patriae jurisdiction 
                                                                                                             
70 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra, note 52, art. 5. See to similar effect 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra, note 65, art. 2. 
71 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra, note 52, art. 6(2). 
72 R. v. Sharpe, [2001] S.C.J. No. 3, 2001 SCC 2, at para. 177 (S.C.C.). 
73 Wilson on Children, supra, note 55, at 1-38 to 1-43. 
74 G. (L.) v. F. (D.), [2000] O.J. No 3432, at para. 9 (Ont. S.C.J.), affd [2001] O.J. No. 888 
(Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “G. (L.)”]. Although the Supreme Court of Canada observed, in E. (Mrs.) v. 
Eve, [1986] S.C.J. No. 60, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 388, at para. 32 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Eve”], that the 
origins of this jurisdiction are “lost in the mists of antiquity”. 
75 Eve, id., at paras. 33-36. 
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meaning literally “parent of the country”.76 The scope of situations in 
which the courts can act pursuant to this jurisdiction extend “as far as is 
necessary for protection and education” and “have never been, and 
indeed cannot, be defined”.77 Even where there is legislation in an area, 
“courts will continue to use the parens patriae jurisdiction to deal with 
uncontemplated situations where it appears necessary to do so for the 
protection of those who fall within its ambit.”78 
In addition to this inherent parens patriae jurisdiction, courts 
interpret statutes, the common law and the constitution in a manner 
protective of children. This protective stance is perhaps most stark in 
cases in which the child is pitted against the state in constitutional 
litigation. As Professor Wilson has observed: 
The high level of scrutiny afforded to the Charter rights of children in 
the criminal context, in light of their recognized vulnerability, is 
similarly applied in the civil context where there is the potential for 
severe impact on the life, liberty or health of a child — however often 
with different results. Whereas in the former, the child receives greater 
protections through the Charter compared to her adult counterpart, in 
the latter the Charter rights of children may not be recognized or can be 
subsumed by the legal principle of the best interests of the child.
79
 
These apparently divergent results can be rationalized when one 
considers the twin principles informing the legal conception of childhood 
— dependence and potential for development. Cases that focus on a 
child’s constitutional rights tend to prioritize immediate protection of the 
child’s life and health giving diminished weight to his or her liberty 
interests.
80
 
                                                                                                             
76 G. (L.), supra, note 74, at para. 9. 
77 Eve, supra, note 74, at paras. 42, 43. 
78 Id., at para. 42. The Court has explained that the jurisdiction must be exercised in accordance 
with its underlying principle and must “at all times be exercised with great caution” (at para. 77). 
79 Wilson on Children, supra, note 55, at 1-70. 
80 See, e.g., R. v. M. (M.R.), [1998] S.C.J. No. 83, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 393 (S.C.C.), where the 
Court explained the rationale for departing from the usual requirement, under s. 8 of the Charter, that 
prior authorization from a neutral arbiter be obtained before a search of a student by a school official 
was reasonably conducted. At para. 35, the Court held: 
Teachers and principals are placed in a position of trust that carries with it onerous 
responsibilities. When children attend school or school functions, it is they who must care 
for the children’s safety and well-being. It is they who must carry out the fundamentally 
important task of teaching children so that they can function in our society and fulfil their 
potential. In order to teach, school officials must provide an atmosphere that encourages 
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Consider, for example, the constitutional validity of limiting a 
minor’s authority to refuse life-saving medical treatment. At common 
law, such evaluations are governed by the mature minor doctrine, which 
recognizes a degree of decision-making autonomy reflective of a child’s 
“evolving intelligence and understanding” and maturity, “with the degree 
to which maturity is scrutinized intensifying in accordance with the 
severity of the potential consequences of the treatment or its refusal”.81 
The reason for this “sliding scale of scrutiny” and decision-making82 is 
the tension between autonomy and child protection. In C. (A.), 
Manitoba’s statutory scheme was at issue and the majority interpreted the 
legislated best interest of the child standard to allow a minor the 
opportunity to demonstrate her maturity in a manner consistent with, 
among other things, “the evolutionary development of the common law 
‘mature minor’ doctrine”83 and “international standards” as expressed in 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
84
 For the majority, such an 
approach satisfied the state’s role in protecting children,85 the child’s 
interest in exercising her capacity for autonomous choice,
86
 and society’s 
interest in “nurturing children’s potential for autonomy by according 
weight to their choices in a manner that is reflective of their evolving 
maturity”.87 According to the majority, such an interpretation ensured the 
legislation was Charter compliant.
88
 
                                                                                                             
learning. During the school day they must protect and teach our children. In no small 
way, teachers and principals are responsible for the future of the country. 
See also at paras. 35-50. 
81 C. (A.), supra, note 52, at para. 46. This doctrine does not entitle mature minors to make 
all decisions related to their medical care including the decision to refuse life-saving medical 
treatment. Instead, such “mature minors” remain subject to the court’s parens patriae jurisdiction 
(id., at paras. 47, 54). The wishes and objections of a minor weigh more heavily in the Court’s 
assessment of his or her best interests in accordance with the minor’s maturity (id., at paras. 55, 56). 
However, to date, no court in the United Kingdom or Canada has allowed a child under 16 to refuse 
medical treatment that was likely to preserve the child’s prospects of a healthy future (id., at paras. 
57, 59). Similarly courts in both Australia and the United States have recognized that a child’s 
authority to make medical decisions can be overridden (id., at paras. 65, 66, 68). 
82 Id., at paras. 22, 115. 
83 Id., at para. 23. 
84 Id., at paras. 80, 93, 97-98. 
85 Id., at para. 104. 
86 Id., at para. 105. 
87 Id., at para. 105. 
88 Id., at para. 115. 
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As the majority of the Court observed in C. (A.), principles of 
welfare and autonomy often collapse “when one appreciates the extent to 
which respecting a demonstrably mature adolescent’s capacity for 
autonomous judgment is ‘by definition in his or her best interests’”.89 
This collapsing of interests occurs because of the state’s interest in 
supporting a child’s development: 
As L’Heureux-Dubé J. said in Young v. Young, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3, 
“courts must be directed to create or support the conditions which are 
most conducive to the flourishing of the child” (p. 65 (emphasis 
added)). And in King v. Low, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 87, McIntyre J. observed: 
“It must be the aim of the Court … to choose the course which will best 
provide for the healthy growth, development and education of the child 
so that he will be equipped to face the problems of life as a mature 
adult” (p. 101 (emphasis added)). When applied to adolescents, 
therefore, the “best interests” standard must be interpreted in a way that 
reflects and addresses an adolescent’s evolving capacities for 
autonomous decision-making. It is not only an option for the court to 
treat the child’s views as an increasingly determinative factor as his or 
her maturity increases, it is, by definition, in a child’s best interests to 
respect and promote his or her autonomy to the extent that his or her 
maturity dictates.
90
 
Nevertheless this collapsing of interests will not always result in 
honouring a child’s decision at common law or under provincial statutes 
addressing the issue. So for example, in C. (A.), if there had been no 
ability for minors to demonstrate their capacity under the statute, the 
majority and Binnie J. (dissenting) would likely have agreed that the 
scheme was unconstitutional.
91
 But for the majority, even after 
acknowledging the importance of recognizing a child’s autonomy, 
protection of the child remained paramount. The child’s capacity 
remained one factor among others to consider in assessing the best 
interests of the child.
92
 The majority noted that using this approach to 
date, no court in the United Kingdom or Canada has allowed a child 
under 16 to refuse medical treatment that was likely to preserve the 
                                                                                                             
89 Id., at para. 84. 
90 Id., at para. 88 (emphasis added in C. (A.)). 
91 Id., at para. 116, per Abella J.; at para. 224, per Binnie J. 
92 Justice Binnie, dissenting, would have given greater weight to a minor’s liberty interests 
and would have required that once a minor successfully demonstrated his or her capacity, this would 
determine who made the medical decisions in question (the minor): id., at para. 194, per Binnie J. 
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child’s prospects of a healthy future even if, as had occurred in the 
United Kingdom, the child was found to have capacity.
93
 In its 
application, then, the majority’s approach may have played out just as 
McLachlin C.J.C.’s dissenting judgment did — that is, with an 
irrebuttable presumption that persons under the age of 16 would not 
make life-threatening medical decisions. For McLachlin C.J.C., 
interpreting the legislation in this manner did not put it off-side of the 
Charter because the “protection of a child’s right to life and to health, 
when it becomes necessary to do so, is a basic tenet of our legal system, 
and legislation to that end accords with the principles of fundamental 
justice, so long, of course, as it also meets the requirements of fair 
procedure”.94 Thus we see that the majority of judges in C. (A.) 
(including McLachlin C.J.C.) recognized the priority that the 
jurisprudence has placed on a child’s life and well-being over his or her 
autonomy. 
Together this overview of the legal landscape as it relates to minors 
in Canada suggests that courts and legislatures are properly motivated by 
children’s inherent vulnerability and dependence and also their capacity 
for growth and development. To the extent there is tension between these 
factors, such as when a child’s life and health hangs in the balance, 
courts are likely to take positive measures to guard the child’s immediate 
physical well-being, in part, in order to protect the child’s capacity for 
development and his or her future adult autonomy. This second 
observation, then, demonstrates that Canadian courts are institutionally 
competent to protect children’s positive rights. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The unique nature of children and their relation to the state as well as 
Canadian laws and jurisprudence support recognition of positive rights to 
secure basic needs for children under section 7 of the Charter. While past 
claims for positive rights advanced by adults under section 7 have not 
met with success, this paper has proposed a modest and incremental 
advance for socio-economic rights advocacy. Such an approach ought to 
                                                                                                             
93 Id., at paras. 57, 59. Similarly, courts in both Australia and the United States have recognized 
that a child’s authority to make medical decisions can be overridden (id., at paras. 65, 66, 68). 
94 Id., at para. 127, per McLachlin C.J.C., dissenting, citing a concurring majority judgment 
in B. (R.), supra, note 53, at para. 88. 
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be adopted by the courts in the interests of justice — that is, to ensure 
that everyone has an equal opportunity to access society’s most important 
institutions. The Supreme Court of Canada has recently opined that 
“[e]nsuring access to justice is the greatest challenge to the rule of law in 
Canada today”.95 When the Supreme Court of Canada uttered these 
words, the access to justice it had in mind was the civil justice system, in 
other words, access to the courts. But “justice” is not synonymous with 
“courts”, and the Court’s words ring true in respect of the broader 
concept of justice discussed in this paper. Positive rights for children, in 
recognition of both their vulnerability and capacity for growth, are 
important to ensure their future ability to access justice by participating 
in society’s most important institutions, which in turn will ensure the 
legitimacy of those institutions. 
However, there are risks in focusing litigation on children to the 
exclusion of adults in need of the same socio-economic rights. Such a 
narrow focus could reinforce incorrect and stereotypical views about 
people living in poverty such as that poor people should not have 
children and if they do their children will become social problems.
96
 It 
could reinforce the view that adult poverty is the product of individual 
moral failure or legitimate political decision-making.
97
 It risks erasing 
“from public discourse the realities of parents, primarily women, living 
in poverty, and to ignore the injustices and systemic patterns of 
discrimination that cause poverty”.98 Great care will be needed to ensure 
that public advocacy and evidence assembled in any case directed at 
positive rights for children is sensitive and responsive to these criticisms. 
Nevertheless, this need for sensitivity should not deter Charter challenges 
to insufficient state action in the face of deprivations of children’s basic 
needs. Courts have balked at more broadly based claims for positive rights, 
expressing concerns about the “uncertain” and possibly “enormous” 
                                                                                                             
95 Hryniak v. Mauldin, [2014] S.C.J. No. 7, 2014 SCC 7, at para. 1 (S.C.C.). 
96 Bruce Porter, “Claiming Adjudicative Space: Social Rights, Equality and Citizenship” in 
Margot Young et al., eds., Poverty: Rights, Social Citizenship and Legal Activism (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2007) 77, at 85 [hereinafter “Porter 2007”]. 
97 Id., at 80. In respect of risks inherent in recognizing social and economic rights more 
generally, see Just Words, supra, note 47. 
98 Porter 2007, supra, note 96, at 86. 
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impact that such recognition could entail.
99
 Advocates must heed this 
caution and focus their claims more narrowly.  
It could also be suggested that a focus on children invites the state to 
discipline parenting — a sphere that normally enjoys a high degree of 
privacy and autonomy.
100
 The first response to this concern is simply that 
at the point where children’s health and development is jeopardized, the 
state already steps in to discipline parenting. More fundamentally 
though, relegating concerns about children’s access to their basic needs 
to the purely private sphere is simply inappropriate. It means that harms 
suffered by children are no longer considered harms of injustice and the 
response to these harms, though perhaps beneficent, is no longer the 
demand of justice. Yet ensuring that children have the opportunities to 
reach their full potential, regardless of their parents’ means, is necessary 
to ensure that systems of inequality are improved and public institutions 
remain legitimate.  
Further, the extent to which this concern materializes hinges on the 
remedy imposed by the courts. Many have observed that recognition of 
positive rights would be difficult if not impossible to enforce because of 
remedial difficulties
101
 or institutional competency issues,
102
 or because 
of concerns about democracy and judicial legitimacy.
103
 These concerns 
are simply not tenable in light of the courts’ current approach to 
children’s welfare discussed above and also in light of international 
experience, which includes successful judicial enforcement of socio-
economic rights in many different legal systems.
104
 In Canada, the 
recognition of a positive right lends itself to declaratory relief that the 
various levels of government have failed in their obligation under section 7 
to provide children with their basic needs.
105
 A declaration could draw on 
                                                                                                             
99 Pratten SC, supra, note 26, at para. 290. In the s. 15 context Professor Lessard has 
mapped out the limits that scarcity places on justice in practice: Lessard 2012, supra, note 9. 
100 This concern resonates with the classist, colonial and racist history of child welfare, 
which has been explained elsewhere. See, e.g., Borrows & Rotman, supra, note 55, c. 10, at 830; 
Lessard 2002, supra, note 55, at 727. 
101 Jackman 2000, supra, note 9, at 238, 243; Young 2005, supra, note 9, at 551. 
102 Jackman 2000, id., at 239-40; Young 2005, id., at 552-56. 
103 Jackman 2000, id., at 243-44; Young 2005, id., at 548. 
104 Langford 2008, supra, note 42, at 3-45; “Freedom from Want”, supra, note 9, at 15. 
105 For a discussion of available remedies to enforce socio-economic rights, see Kent Roach, 
“The Challenges of Crafting Remedies for Violations of Socio-Economic Rights” in Social Rights 
Jurisprudence, supra, note 42, at 46-58. Professor Roach argues that more prospective and dialogic 
remedies such as declarations and delayed declarations of invalidity can play a role in remediating 
socio-economic rights violations and may be particularly apt in jurisdictions like Canada at least “to 
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article 2 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights
106
 and its requirement that states must take reasonable steps based 
on a maximum of available resources.
107
 Such a remedy is “an effective 
and flexible remedy for the settlement of real disputes”.108 It provides 
deference at the remedial stage to ensure governments are left with a 
measure of discretion in adopting policy options to achieve Charter 
compliance. It would then fall to government to fashion an effective 
solution in light of the right recognized. If government failed to do so, 
subsequent litigation could be brought building on the initial declaration 
obtained. Or alternatively, the initial court could retain supervisory 
jurisdiction to ensure a meaningful remedy was achieved. Government 
will be held responsible to the extent that it “can truly be held 
accountable for the inability [of children] to exercise the right or freedom 
in question”.109 Thus, the extent to which the state, in the exercise of its 
remedial jurisdiction, then disciplines what the family does with any 
means it provides to families to vindicate children’s rights will open it up 
to increasing spheres of accountability. 
And this last point raises a final concern with recognizing positive 
rights for children alone, and that is the virtual impossibility of 
separating a child from the family upon which he or she is dependent. 
This impossibility need not be a weakness in cases for positive rights for 
children but rather can be their greatest strength. As Ezer has pointed out, 
“children’s and parents’ rights can be mutually reinforcing. It is both 
healthier and more realistic to view children’s and parents’ rights as 
fundamentally linked to each other.”110 Recognition of positive rights for 
                                                                                                             
start the process of compliance” (at 46, 50, 52-53, 58). See, e.g., Eldridge v. British Columbia, 
[1997] S.C.J. No. 86, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624, at para. 96 (S.C.C.); Gosselin, supra, note 10,  
at paras. 296-297, per Bastarache J. in dissent. Professor Roach notes that injunctions and retention 
of supervisory jurisdiction by courts may be appropriate “where it is clear that governments are 
either unwilling or unable to respect” the rights at issue (at 47, 53-55). See, e.g., Doucet-Boudreau v. 
Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), [2003] S.C.J. No. 63, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). 
106 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra, note 65. 
107 In Social Rights Jurisprudence, supra, note 42, at 211, the authors note that such an 
approach is already familiar to Canadian courts’ approach to human rights protections. 
108 R. v. Gamble, [1988] S.C.J. No. 87, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 595 (S.C.C.); Canada (Prime 
Minister) v. Khadr, [2010] S.C.J. No. 3, 2010 SCC 3, at para. 46 (S.C.C.). 
109 Pratten CA, supra, note 28, at para. 49, citing Dunmore, supra, note 28, at para. 26. 
110 Ezer, supra, note 9, at 42. An example of how closely linked these rights are can be seen 
in New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), [1999] S.C.J. No. 47, 
[1999] 3 S.C.R. 46 (S.C.C.), where the Supreme Court of Canada recognized that a parent’s s. 7 
right to security of the person is engaged by state removal of a child from parental custody. As such, 
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children today could lead to recognition of positive rights for parents 
tomorrow. Such incremental recognition and protection of Charter rights 
at some point down the road is not a floodgate to be protected against but 
rather the natural result of the slow and incremental approach to rights 
recognition endorsed by courts to date
111
 and one entirely consistent with 
the values underlying the Charter. 
                                                                                                             
the Court required the government to provide the parent with state-funded counsel under s. 24(1) of 
the Charter. 
111 See, e.g., Gosselin, supra, note 10, at paras. 79, 82; R. v. Hynes, [2001] S.C.J. No. 80, 
2001 SCC 82, at para. 114 (S.C.C.). 
  
 
